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 The cooperative as an agricultural business form enjoyed a heyday in Europe in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.1 As a project, co-operation made a number of 
sometimes competing promises, but at its core was the idea of democratic control of an 
economic enterprise, to the mutual benefit (whether economic, social, or cultural) of its 
members. Yet this promise of democratic empowerment of consumers and producers was 
often illusory, limited in practice by the prioritization of other goals including economic 
rationalization, the promotion of public education in farming and business techniques, and the 
shoring up of other sources of authority in rural society. In Ireland, the movement for 
economic cooperation was driven from above, first by a philanthropic organization loosely 
supported by the British administration in Ireland, and then, in the case of the creameries, 
directly by the independent Irish state. It argues that the cooperative movement in Ireland 
never aimed simply to preserve landlord or state power, or to empower farmers. Instead, it 
was the means through which power was renegotiated between farmers, landlords, and the 
state in the context of two crucial transitional moments: the massive, subsidized land transfers 
from landlords to owner-occupiers at the turn of the century,2 and the shift to independent 
statehood in the interwar years. In both contexts, farmers held considerable potential political 
power, which the cooperative movement promised to channel productively toward rural 
stability and prosperity. The Free State government, in particular, successfully used the 
1 Giovanni Federico, Feeding the World: An Economic History of Agriculture (Princeton, 
2005), pp. 168-70. 
2 McLaughlin, “Competing forms of cooperation,” p. 83; N. Foley-Fisher and E. McLaughlin, 
“Capitalising on the Irish land question: land reform and state banking in Ireland, 1891-
1938,” Financial History Review 23: 1 (2016): 71-109; T. W. Guinnane and R. I. Miller, 
“The Limits to Land Reform: The Land Acts in Ireland, 1870-1909,” Economic Development 
and Cultural Change 45: 3 (April 1997): 591-612. 
                                                      
cooperative form to intervene in the dairy industry, limiting the influence of British 
companies and arresting the deteriorating Irish reputation for butter. The reality was more 
complex, as farmers struggled effectively to wield the self-governance that the cooperative 
movement at turns offered and withheld. At the local level, therefore, the cooperative 
movement tended to reinforce rather than revolutionize existing hierarchies.  
The article’s specific lens for making this case is the problem of managing cooperative 
creameries, framed by debate about the role of the state and the source of appropriate 
leadership. Although cooperation in Ireland extended to banking, supply stores, and other 
agricultural industries, it made its greatest impact in the arena of cooperative creameries.3 At 
creameries, farmers pooled their milk and processed it using the new centrifugal cream 
separator, which produced sweeter, less salty butter and had allowed farmers elsewhere, 
particularly in Europe, to gain an edge in the British butter market.4 Individual proprietors or 
larger business concerns, often based in Britain, established some proprietary creameries in 
Ireland. The Irish Agricultural Organisation Society (IAOS), by contrast, organized groups of 
farmers to found cooperative creameries, funded by subscribed share capital and run by a 
committee overseeing a paid manager and, usually, other staff as well.. Over time, co-
3 L. Kennedy, “Farmers, Traders, and Agricultural Politics in Pre-Independence Ireland,” in 
S. Clark and J. S. Donnelly, Jr., eds., Irish Peasants: Violence & Political Unrest, 1780-1914 
(Madison, 1983), pp. 339-73; P. Bolger, The Irish Co-operative Movement: Its History and 
Development (Dublin, 1977). 
4 M. Lampe and P. Sharp, “How the Danes discovered Britain: the international integration of 
the Danish dairy industry before 1880,” European Review of Economic History 19 (2015): 
432-53; C. Ó Gráda, “The Beginnings of the Irish Creamery System, 1880-1914,” The 
Economic History Review 30: 2 (May 1977): 284-305, pp. 286-7. 
                                                      
operative creameries came to predominate.5 By 1915, over 100,000 Irish farmers were 
members of co-operative societies.6 
The article’s emphasis is on continuity across the rupture of 1922. As Part I argues, the 
early cooperative movement in Ireland was animated by a utopian vision of economic 
efficiency and a rural order that preserved a role for the Anglo-Irish landlord class. It was part 
of a self-conscious effort to develop an authentically Irish form of capitalism. At the same 
time, it was linked, through ideology and personnel, with constructive unionism: its 
proponents saw agricultural reform as more worthwhile than nationalist agitation. In that 
context, the movement’s top-down approach could be seen as narrowly political. However, 
the Irish Free State, too, saw cooperation not as a grassroots project but as a vehicle for the 
extension and projection of central authority and, to some degree, planning. After 1922, the 
new government looked to the dairy industry as an important element in establishing 
economic self-sufficiency and political stability. In Part II, the article considers these 
5 Ó Gráda, “The Beginnings of the Irish Creamery System;” W. Jenkins, “Capitalists and Co-
operators: Agricultural Transformation, Contested Space, and Identity Politics in South 
Tipperary, Ireland, 1890-1914,” Journal of Historical Geography 30:1 (2004) 87-111; K. 
O’Rourke, “Property Rights, Politics and Innovation: Creamery Diffusion in pre-1914 
Ireland,” European Review of Economic History 11 (2007): 395-417; and K. O’Rourke, 
“Culture, Conflict and Cooperation: Irish Dairying before the Great War,” The Economic 
Journal 117 (523: Oct. 2007): 1357-79. 
6 L. Kennedy, “Adoption of Group Innovation in Irish Agriculture 1890-1914: an Exercise in 
Applied History,” Oxford Agrarian Studies 6 (1977): 57-70, pp. 66-7. 
                                                      
elements of continuity.7 The Department of Agriculture pushed privately-owned creameries 
out of the sector and replaced them with a system of mandatory co-operatives and state-
owned creameries. This experiment in a modified form of nationalization contributes to the 
revision of the standard story of Irish economic policy in the 1920s: while the Department of 
Finance pursued a laissez-faire orthodoxy, the Department of Agriculture was far more 
innovative.8 Like many other nations during the interwar decades, the Irish Free State was 
interested in self-sufficiency and willing to experiment with new forms of state intervention.9 
Its foray into rationalizing an industry using cooperatives provided a means of attempting 
state direction at one remove, while bolstering the interests of an important population and 
limiting the power of international corporations on Irish industry.  
7 On administrative continuity generally, see M. Maguire, The Civil Service and the 
Revolution in Ireland, 1912-38: “Shaking Hands with the Blood-stained Hand of Mr. 
Collins” (Manchester, 2008); R. Fanning, The Irish Department of Finance (Dublin, 1978). 
8 A. Bielenberg and R. Ryan, An Economic History of Ireland since Independence (New 
York, 2013), pp. 11-12, 75-6; Mícheál Ó Fathartaigh, Irish Agriculture Nationalised: The 
Dairy Disposal Company and the Making of the Modern Irish Dairy Industry (Dublin, 2014). 
But see T. K. Daniel, ‘Griffith on his Noble Head: The Determinants of Cumann na 
nGaedheal Economic Policy, 1922-32,’ Irish Economic and Social History 3 (1976): 55-65, 
pp. 55-6; J.J. Lee, “From Empire to Europe: the Irish state 1922-73,” in M. Adshead, P. 
Kirby, and M. Millar, eds., Contesting the State: Lessons from the Irish Case (Manchester, 
2008), pp. 36-7. 
9 K. K. Patel, The New Deal: A Global History (Princeton, 2016); G. Keown, “Taking the 
World Stage: Creating an Irish Foreign Policy in the 1920s,” in M. Kennedy and J. M. Skelly, 
eds., Irish Foreign Policy, 1919-66: From Independence to Internationalism (Dublin, 2000), 
pp. 42-3. 
                                                      
Creamery committees always preserved some of their independence in the face of 
direction from above. The work of managing the creamery, however, proved a particular site 
of tension. While the dairy farmers on the committee were, in theory, in charge of the 
creamery, they had to rely on the labour of a paid manager to run the business. Although both 
farmers and managers shared the goal of a profitable creamery, their interests could diverge: 
farmers generally had longer-term interest in the creamery, while managers saw their 
positions in terms of salary, benefits, and career advancement. A frustrated or poorly-paid 
manager might opportunistically seek profit in illegal or semi-legal practices. In practice, 
committees often struggled to exercise adequate oversight of the manager’s business 
practices without the assistance of a more educated and powerful president or honorary 
president: a local landlord or clergyman, frequently, who could serve as an effective 
intermediary.  While Ó Gráda argues that farmers maintained a hard-nosed attitude to co-
operation10 and Breathnach describes them as “reluctant co-operators” who rarely 
participated in their creameries’ governance,11 more recent work by Kennelly and Mathews 
emphasizes the movement’s Catholic and democratic character at the grassroots level.12 This 
article draws on minutes and correspondence from creameries mainly located in Kilkenny 
and Waterford to paint a different picture, one that emphasizes the structural difficulties faced 
10 Ó Gráda, “The Beginnings of the Irish Creamery System,” p. 300. 
11 P. Breathnach, “Reluctant Co-operators: Dairy Farmers and the Spread of Creameries in 
Ireland, 1886-1920,” in P. J. Duffy and W. Nolan, eds., At the Anvil: Essays in Honour of 
William J. Smyth (Dublin, 2012), p. 556. 
12 J. J. Kennelly, “The ‘Dawn of the Practical’: Horace Plunkett and the Cooperative 
Movement,” New Hibernia Review / Irish Éireannach Nua 12: 1 (Earrach/Spring 2008): 62-
81, pp. 79-80. See P. J. Mathews, Revival: The Abbey Theatre, Sinn Féin, the Gaelic League 
and the Co-operative Movement (Cork, 2003), p. 31. 
                                                      
by farmers seeking to govern their creameries effectively. Located outside of the Golden 
Vale, which contains Ireland’s best dairy land, this region nonetheless saw a dense network 
of creameries develop. Significantly, they can be studied not only through correspondence 
with the IAOS but also through the committee minutes deposited in the Kilkenny Archives, 
allowing a more multi-dimensional picture of local experience to be developed. Farmers on 
cooperative creamery committees were not necessarily reluctant, apathetic, or 
disenfranchised. However, they struggled with a system that was not designed to give them 
the necessary tools to exercise real control over the management of their businesses, but 
instead to foster their reliance on local leaders. 
 Much of the existing scholarship on Irish cooperation, and especially cooperative 
creameries, is concerned with exploring the relative failure of the movement either to 
dominate the butter industry before the 1920s or to increase Ireland’s ability to compete 
successfully in the British butter market in the face of new competition.13 Denmark, in 
particular, is a point of productive comparison. Scholars have pointed to various reasons for 
Ireland’s lacklustre performance, particularly the religious and political cleavages that 
marked late 19th and early 20th century Irish society.14 A new strand of scholarship 
emphasizes that Irish cooperatives offered no institutional advantages over existing 
proprietary forms.15 Henriksen, McLaughlin, and Sharpe conclude that Irish cooperative 
13 Cullen, An Economic History of Ireland, p. 155. 
14 O’Rourke, “Culture, Conflict and Cooperation”; O’Rourke, “Property Rights, Politics and 
Innovation.” 
15 E. McLaughlin, “Competing forms of cooperation? Land League, Land War and 
cooperation in Ireland, 1879 to 1914,” Agricultural History Review 63: 1, 81-112, p. 83; but 
see I. Henriksen, M. Lampe, and P. Sharp, “The role of technology and institutions for 
                                                      
creameries suffered from their difficulty in developing enforceable binding contracts which 
would allow cooperatives to oblige their members to do business with them.16 McLaughlin 
also argues that political divisions prevented cooperative banks from benefiting from 
adequate local management capabilities and expertise.17 This article broadens the point about 
management, which served as a flashpoint for the inherent tensions of a movement that both 
encouraged and limited democratic engagement.  
 
I 
The Irish co-operative movement portrayed itself as a democratic manifestation of a 
specifically Irish genius, but it was founded on the principle that Irish rural life required both 
local leadership and a supportive central administration to recover from decades of 
mismanagement. Just as W. B. Yeats and his compatriots in the Irish National Theatre 
wanted to reinvent an authentically Irish art through the English language, Sir Horace 
Plunkett, one of the IAOS’s founders, saw the cooperative movement as a way to regenerate 
a distinctively Irish culture.18 His comrade George Russell (AE) likewise saw cooperative 
growth: Danish creameries in the late nineteenth century,” European Review of Economic 
History 15 (2011): 475-93. 
16 I. Henriksen, E. McLaughlin, and P. Sharp, “Contracts and cooperation: the relative failure 
of the Irish dairy industry in the late nineteenth century reconsidered,” European Review of 
Economic History 19 (2015): 412-31; I. Henriksen, M. Hviid, and P. Sharp, “Law and Peace: 
Contracts and the Success of the Danish Dairy Cooperatives,” The Journal of Economic 
History 72: 1 (March 2012). 
17 McLaughlin, “Competing forms of cooperation,” p. 108. 
18 “Address of the Right Hon. Sir Horace Plunkett, President of the I.A.O.S.,” The Coming of 
Age of the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society (Dublin, 1915), pp. 8-9, 13. See C. King, 
                                                                                                                                                                        
action as the basis for rebuilding a “rural civilization” in Ireland.19 Deeply sceptical of the 
notion that what the Irish needed was to become more like the English,20 Plunkett argued that 
the Irish preference for “thinking and working in groups” could be the basis for moving 
beyond the standards of British political economy.21  Pre-colonial legacies of communal land 
ownership had prepared them for modern cooperation.22 Yet even as he sang their praises, 
both men considered Irish farmers to be profoundly damaged by their history.23 Plunkett 
sometimes linked their failings to Catholicism,24 but more often traced them to the negative 
effects of British rule, which, he argued, had stunted the Irish character in the service of 
“Co-operation and Rural Development: Plunkett’s Approach,” in J. Davis, ed., Rural Change 
in Ireland (Belfast, 1999), pp. 45-57, 46; Mathews, Revival; L. Lane, “‘There are 
Compensations in the Congested Districts for their Poverty’: AE and the Idealized Peasant of 
the Agricultural Co-operative,” in B. T. FitzSimon and J. H. Murphy, eds., The Irish Revival 
Reappraised (Dublin, 2004); Plunkett, Ireland in the New Century, p. viii.  
19 G. W. Russell, Co-operation and Nationality: A Guide for Rural Reformers from This to 
the Next Generation (1912; Dublin, 1982), p. 7. 
20 Plunkett, Ireland in the New Century, p. 19.  
21 Plunkett, Ireland in the New Century, p. 167. 
22 Plunkett, Ireland in the New Century, p. 21; Russell, Co-operation and Nationality, p. 7. 
See C. Nash, “Visionary Geographies: Designs for Developing Ireland,” History Workshop 
Journal 45 (Spring 1998): 49-79, p. 61. 
23 Plunkett, Ireland in the New Century, p. 164. 
24 Plunkett, Ireland in the New Century, pp. 110, 121. See Kennelly, “The ‘Dawn of the 
Practical’,” pp. 73-4; O’Rourke, “Culture, Conflict and Cooperation.” 
                                                                                                                                                                        
protecting English industry from competition.25 Russell emphasized the deleterious effects of 
a politics too focused on national independence.26 
 Reversing degeneration from above did not necessarily mean direct state involvement. 
The leaders of the cooperative movement were fearful of the effects of over-reliance on the 
state “to the utter destruction of self-reliance, initiative, and independence of spirit,” in 
Russell’s words.27 In practice, the movement had a complicated relationship with the British 
administration, which tried to promote agricultural improvement through alliances with 
private or semi-private associations.28 It relied on small financial grants from the government 
but also crossed swords with the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction 
(DATI), founded in 1899 and increasingly unsympathetic with the project of cooperation.29 
Instead, the Irish cooperative movement sought to provide leadership, first, through the IAOS 
itself, which would provide technical expertise and education beyond the remit of the state. 
Second, it emphasized the importance of progressive local leadership.30 Plunkett believed 
that Anglo-Irish landlords had a vital role to play in supplying this leadership. Sketching out 
the future movement in 1890, he planned to “seek pioneers among those who have leisure to 
25 Plunkett, Ireland in the New Century, pp. 18, 57-8, 152. See H. Plunkett, The New 
Movement in Ireland  (Dublin, 1899), pp. 8-9. 
26 Russell, Co-operation and Nationality, p. 1. 
27 Russell, Co-operation and Nationality, p. 26. 
28 C. Breathnach, The Congested Districts Board of Ireland, 1891-1923: Poverty and 
Development in the West of Ireland (Dublin, 2005), p. 174. 
29 M. Daly, The First Department: a History of the Department of Agriculture (Dublin, 
2002), 1; Plunkett, Ireland in the New Century, pp. 261-2. 
30 King, “Co-operation and Rural Development,” pp. 47-50; Lane, “‘There are 
Compensations,’” p. 33. 
                                                      
consider the question and intelligence to master it details.”31 While emphasizing the need for 
ordinary people to provide the “motive-power” for the co-operative movement, Plunkett 
argued that the gentry were the natural people to “stimulate” and “direct” that power.32  
Nationalists accused the IAOS and its proponents of launching a campaign, under the 
cover of co-operation, to distract farmers from Home Rule and ensure a continued role for the 
declining Ascendency class.33 Indeed, both Plunkett and Russell saw their efforts to reform 
agricultural policy more important than the pursuit of home rule.34 The cooperative 
movement was part of the tradition of constructive unionism which emphasized economic 
and social improvements rather than a change in Ireland’s constitutional status.35 The 
division between nationalism and the ethos of the Irish cooperative movement should not, 
however, be overstated. In its first decade, the government of the Irish Free State developed a 
policy toward cooperative creameries that betrays considerable logical continuities with the 
vision of the pre-independence cooperative movement. 
 
II 
31 Plunkett, Co-operation for Ireland, pp. 7-8, 12-13 (quote, 7). See King, “Co-operation and 
Rural Development,” p. 53.  
32 H. Plunkett, Noblesse Oblige: An Irish Rendering (Dublin, 1908),p. 25.  
33 Jenkins, “Capitalists and Co-operators,” pp. 102-3. 
34 Daly, The First Department, 2; Russell, Co-operation and Nationality, p. 56. 
35 M. McAteer, “Reactionary Conservatism or Radical Utopianism? AE and the Irish 
Cooperative Movement,” Eire-Ireland 35: 3-4 (2000-1): 148-62, pp. 155-6; C. Ehrlich, 
“Horace Plunkett and Agricultural Reform,” in J. M. Goldstrom and L. A. Clarkson, eds., 
Irish Population, Economy, and Society: Essays in Honour of the late K. H. Connell (Oxford, 
1981). 
                                                      
Like the IAOS, the Irish Free State government saw cooperative creameries as a 
productive site for rural improvement and intervention. Rather than moral degeneration, 
however, the Free State sought to address what they saw as unwelcome competition and a 
declining reputation for Irish butter in the British marketplace. The Free State’s first Minister 
of Agriculture, Patrick J. Hogan, quickly became one of his party’s leaders on economic 
policy, arguing that the maximization of farmer income rather than general economic self-
sufficiency should be the government’s goal. Although publicly opposed to state intervention, 
he was nonetheless the architect of a far-reaching intervention into the dairy industry – an 
industry he described as “the foundation of Irish agriculture.”36 That foundation, however, 
faced some significant challenges.37 The temporary wartime boom and the subsequent fall in 
agricultural prices after 1920 had significant effects.38 The 1924 Report of the Commission 
on Agriculture, which was characterized by substantial input from the staff of the DATI and a 
strong support for co-operation,39  found that the cooperative movement was plagued by a 
lack of share capital, weak loyalty, and poor business methods.40 Hogan agreed that co-
36 Daly, The First Department, p. 127 (quote);  W. Murphy, “Hogan, Patrick J. (‘Paddy’ in J. 
McGuire and J. Quinn, eds., Dictionary of Irish Biography (Cambridge, 2009); R. Ryan, 
“The Butter Industry in Ireland, 1922-1939,” Irish Economic and Social History 28 (2001): 
32-46, pp. 33-4. 
37 Bielenberg and Ryan, An Economic History of Ireland, p. 49; Daly, The First Department, 
p. 99; D. Gillmor, “The Political Factor in Agricultural History: Trends in Irish Agriculture, 
1922-85,” The Agricultural History Review 37: 2 (1989): 166-79. 
38 J. Meenan, The Irish Economy since 1922 (Liverpool, 1970), pp. 302-3; Cullen, An 
Economic History of Ireland, p. 172. 
39 Daly, The First Department, p. 121. 
40 Breathnach, “Reluctant Co-operators,” p. 571; Daly, The First Department, pp. 118-21. 
                                                      
operative creameries were in a parlous state, undermined by unrepresentative committees and 
bank loans as well as competition with each other and the proprietary creameries.41 
Cooperative and proprietary creameries, the latter often under British ownership, competed 
for suppliers’ milk without increasing the price paid in what was described as a “milk war.”42 
From Hogan’s perspective, the situation was untenable: decreased farmer income combined 
with foreign influence could not be allowed to persist. 
A raft of legislation tackled the problem through increased regulation, marketing 
provisions, and, most significantly, the transformation of butter-making into an all-
cooperative industry. The Dairy Produce Act (1924) imposed regulations on the 
manufacturing of butter.43 Further legislation supported butter prices and attempted to 
regularize marketing.44 Far more innovative, however, was the government’s effort, based on 
a suggestion from the IAOS,45 to remake the landscape of the dairy industry by eliminating 
proprietary creameries entirely. By its own account, the Irish state sought, thereby, to define 
and reduce inefficient competition. Redundant creameries reduced economies of scale and 
41 Daly, The First Department, pp. 127-8. 
42 W. Jenkins, “Rationalisation of Dairy Co-operatives (1950-1990) in the Slieveardagh 
Region, S. Tipperary,” Landscape and Life: Appropriate Scales for Sustainable Development 
Working Paper No. 13 (Dublin, 1994), p. 2; Ó Fathartaigh, Irish Agriculture Nationalised, p. 
13; Ryan, “The Butter Industry,” p. 36. 
43 Ryan, “The Butter Industry,” pp. 34-6. 
44 Bielenberg and Ryan, An Economic History of Ireland, p. 52; Ryan, “The Butter Industry.” 
45 Ó Fathartaigh, Irish Agriculture Nationalised, p. 16; National Co-operative Archive, 
Manchester (hereafter NCA), FAC/4/1/3IAOS Annual Report 1924 Draft, pp. 11-12. 
                                                      
increased overhead costs for farmers, but because of low butter prices, competition did not 
increase either prices paid for milk or the overall milk supply.46  
In 1926, the government purchased properties belonging to the Condensed Milk 
Company and the Newmarket Dairy Company, which had recently merged.47 It began 
reorganizing those districts, selling some properties to co-operative societies and closing 
others.48 In order to facilitate this transfer, it created the Dairy Disposal Company, originally 
conceived as a holding company.49 Over the next several years, the remit of the Dairy 
Disposal Company expanded. Mícheál Ó Fathartaigh argues that it evolved from a temporary 
holding company “into a commercial state-sponsored company.”50 It set up traveling 
creameries, separators housed in trucks, in areas where remoteness and isolation had 
previously made creameries unviable.51 The Creamery Act of 1928 facilitated the transfer of 
creameries to co-operative societies.52 The IAOS assisted in these transfers, providing 
organizers to give technical assistance to local people learning the cooperative form.53 The 
1928 Act also further entrenched the state’s role in directing the industry by giving the 
46 Ryan, “The Butter Industry,” p. 36. 
47 Ó Fathartaigh, Irish Agriculture Nationalised, p. 16; Daly, The First Department, pp. 128-
9. 
48 National Archives of Ireland, Dublin (hereafter NAI), TAOIS/S2352, “Draft of Creamery 
Transfer Bill;”  Ryan, “The Butter Industry,” p. 36. 
49 Ó Fathartaigh, Irish Agriculture Nationalised, pp. 22-3. 
50 Ó Fathartaigh, Irish Agriculture Nationalised, pp. 26. 
51 Bielenberg and Ryan, An Economic History of Ireland, p. 77; Ryan, “The Butter Industry,” 
pp. 38-9. 
52 NAI, TAOIS/S2352, “Draft of Creamery Transfer Bill.” 
53 NAI, AGO/2005/82/1501, Memorandum of work done by the I.A.O.S. 
                                                      
Ministry of Agriculture authority over the setting up of new creameries.54 The legislation thus 
met the government’s larger goal of preventing private monopolies.55 It did so, however, not 
by encouraging competition in general, but by placing cooperative creameries under stricter 
control.56 Further legislation in 1934 addressed the issues of licensing traveling creameries 
and discouraging joint farmers’ dairies which manufactured butter outside of the creamery 
system. It also extended the state’s control over the manufacture of other milk products, again 
with an explicit goal of preventing wasteful, costly competition.57 
Hogan’s interventions in the dairy industry were widely regarded as beneficial by farmers 
and the IAOS, particularly in light of the global depression and local trade war that developed 
a few years later.58 Historians have largely agreed, crediting the state’s action with the 
survival of the cooperative creamery system and, in part, the stabilization of dairy farmers’ 
incomes.59 The policies that achieved these benefits were in stark contrast to the orthodoxies 
54 NAI, TAOIS/S2352, “Draft of Creamery Transfer Bill.” See Ó Fathartaigh, Irish 
Agriculture Nationalised, pp. 65-76. 
55 Daly, Industrial Development, p. 48. 
56 Jenkins, “Rationalisation of Dairy Co-operatives,” p. 2. See Ryan, “The Butter Industry,” 
pp. 36-7. 
57 NAI, TAOIS/S2960, memo, Department of Agriculture, Proposed Bill to amend Creamery 
Act 1928, 10 July 1934. 
58 NCA, FAC/4/1/3, IAOS Annual Report (Dublin, 1931), p. 13. 
59 Breathnach, “Reluctant Co-operators,” p. 572; Ryan, “The Butter Industry,” p. 46; Ó 
Fathartaigh, Irish Agriculture Nationalised, p. 88; M. Adshead, “State autonomy, state 
capacity and the patterning of politics in the Irish state,” in Adshead et al., Contesting the 
State, p. 65; Bielenberg and Ryan, An Economic History of Ireland, p. 199; Meenan, The 
Irish Economy since 1922, pp. 93-4. 
                                                      
inherited by the Department of Finance, a fact which occasioned some debate within the 
Oireachtas. Critics, including the Department of Finance and some from the Farmers’ Party, 
saw the Dairy Disposal Company as a harbinger of socialism or nationalization.60 Sir John 
Keane, a businessman and landowner from Waterford and an outspoken Anglo-Irish critic of 
the new order, urged that the IAOS and the cooperative creameries alike should be 
independent of state support and coercion,61 stating, presciently: “Once the State begins to 
get hold of any business it has to go on.”62 
Staging its intervention through cooperatives allowed the government to forestall some of 
this criticism, by casting the policy as one that ultimately aimed to put control of creameries 
in farmers’ hands. Certainly, some of the government’s supporters unabashedly advocated 
greater state action that would go beyond the propaganda efforts of bodies like the IAOS. As 
Sen. Thomas Bennett, a landholder and dairy farmer, said:  “People in Ireland have been 
educating those connected with the creameries for twenty-five years, and yet something is 
lacking.”63 In the Dáil, Denis Gorey linked state intervention with successful modernization: 
“the only countries that have come out on top are those where the State interfered.”64 Hogan 
was more measured. He assured the Senate that state intervention would be limited and 
temporary. The government wanted “not to nationalise, but to rationalise the dairying 
60 Ó Fathartaigh, Irish Agriculture Nationalised, pp. 27-9. 
61 Seanad Éireann, Volume 10, 25 July 1928, 1175-6. 
62 Seanad Éireann, Volume 10, 24 July 1928, 1131. 
63 Seanad Éireann, Volume 3, 19 Nov. 1924, 1086-7; P. J. Dempsey and S. Boylan, “Bennett, 
Thomas William Westropp,” in Dictionary of Irish Biography.  
64 Dáil Éireann, Volume 25, 11 July 1928, 223. 
                                                      
industry.” That accomplished, the state would “get out of it. We will have established the 
dairying industry there in the hands of the farmers.”65  
Yet to the Dáil, Hogan explained the underpinning reasons for state intervention in terms 
that cast that ideal into doubt. First, he said, there was the eternal danger of “redundant 
creameries.” Significantly, he linked this danger to an excess of democratic enthusiasm. The 
decision about where to locate a creamery, he said, easily “aroused passions” that could all 
too easily lead to a split in a committee: “and then you will have redundancy all over again.” 
Nor were the only threats internal. There was also the danger of “foreign concerns” with 
“very big amounts of money” who would “be very glad to come in here in the hope of wiping 
out the co-operative system and taking over part of the industry from the farmers again.”66 
Hogan conjures, here, with some of the deepest fears haunting the Irish Free State in the 
1920s: violent splits of the sort that had nearly sundered the new nation during the Irish Civil 
War, and rich foreigners bearing the threat of a return to quasi-colonial domination. Neither 
of these dangers could be easily addressed through local cooperation. Rather, they seemed 
precisely the sort of problems best dealt with by a centralized power, one that could recognize 
undesirable competition and take steps to stop it.  
While O’Rourke suggests that the state embraced cooperation as a result of becoming a 
homogenous nation,67 the Irish Free State government was, in its own way, was just as loathe 
as Plunkett had been to hand over the reins to ordinary farmers. The process of transferring 
creameries to co-operative societies soon stalled. By 1938, the Dairy Disposal Company had 
purchased 215 creameries, of which thirty-four had originally been cooperative; forty-nine of 
the 215 had been transferred to cooperatives, while seventy-two were still being operated by 
65 Seanad Éireann, Volume 10, 24 July 1928, 1150. 
66 Dáil Éireann, Volume 25, 10 July 1928, 154. 
67 O’Rourke, “Culture, Conflict and Cooperation,” pp. 1376-7. 
                                                      
the Dairy Disposal Company and a further ninety-four had been closed.68 While it is true that 
farmers were often unwilling or unable to purchase government-owned creameries, the logic 
of the project had seemed to determine this outcome from the start.69 Indeed, throughout the 
1930s local creamery committees discussed and undertook amalgamations of various sorts,70  
and sometimes sought assistance from the Dairy Disposal Company for those projects.71 
Only a concerted effort by milk suppliers and the Department of Agriculture in the 1970s 
forced the final transfer of its holdings.72  
 
III 
Despite their democratic rhetoric, cooperative creameries were never designed to 
empower individual farmers. Instead, local elites were crucial to their success, as the 
struggles of several Kilkenny creameries to establish and maintain adequate management in 
this era show. In his study of cooperatives founded before 1900 in South Tipperary, Jenkins 
finds that they were founded by landlords, politicians, and Catholic clergymen, and he notes 
that parish priests were particularly well-suited by education and social position to serve as 
chairman of creamery committees.73 In Kilkenny, too, landlords and clergymen played 
precisely the sorts of roles that Plunkett had envisioned. They helped to found creameries and 
provided authoritative guidance on their running. While the prominence of Anglo-Irish 
68 Ryan, “The Butter Industry,” pp. 36-7. 
69 Daly, Industrial Development, p. 37 (quote); Daly, The First Department, pp. 131-3. 
70 NAI 1088/457/11, circular, 20 March 1937. 
71 NAI, 1088/98/9, Riddall, 8 Dec. 1931, and see R. Langford, 11 May 1932.  
72 Ó Fathartaigh, Irish Agriculture Nationalised, p. 267; Jenkins, “Rationalisation of Dairy 
Co-operatives.” 
73 Jenkins, “Capitalists and Co-operators,” pp. 94-5. 
                                                      
landlords diminished after World War I and the War of Independence, local priests remained 
significant for cooperative creameries, underscoring the limits of these institutions as forums 
for farmer self-governance. 
R. H. Prior Wandesforde, Esq., the leading light of the Castlecomer creamery in 
Kilkenny, was exemplary of gentry leadership of the older type.74 The cooperative creamery 
in Castlecomer got underway in 1913, and by 1914 had 47 milk suppliers and a net profit of 
£23.75 As president of the creamery committee, Wandesforde was no mere figurehead. The 
committee delayed important decisions, such as the opening of a store, until he could be 
present.76 In addition to supplying the fresh water needed by the creamery, he offered 
significant financial support. He paid for half of a new sewerage scheme in 1915.77 Later that 
same year, he put up a disproportionate share of the security request by the bank for an 
overdraft.78 And he offered other kinds of services in the style of a lord of the manor. Perhaps 
most charmingly, when the committee decided in June 1916 to put in a plot of flowers and 
74 On Wandesforde, see T. Clavin, “Wandesforde, Christopher,” in Dictionary of Irish 
Biography; W. Nolan, Fassadinin: Land, Settlement and Society in Southeast Ireland 1600-
1850 (Dublin, 1979), p. 199; R. Scahill, Collection List No. 52 Prior-Wandesforde Papers, 
National Library of Ireland, June 2000, at http://www.nli.ie/pdfs/mss%20lists/prior-
wandesforde.pdf. 
75 NCA, FAC/4/1/1, IAOS Annual Report 1895, p. 3; Glanbia Collection, Kilkenny Archives 
(hereafter GCKA), 164/8, Castlecomer Minutes 24 Feb. 1914. 
76 GCKA, 164/8, Castlecomer Minutes 20 May 1913, 4 July 1913, 9 Aug. 1913. 
77 GCKA, 164/8, Castlecomer Minutes, 22 March 1915. 
78 GCKA, 164/8, Castlecomer Minutes, 28 April 1915. 
                                                      
shrubs at the back of the creamery, the manager “was directed to ask Mrs. Wandesforde for 
the services of her gardener in striking out [the] garden.”79 
The IAOS evidently expected local Anglo-Irish worthies to take this sort of lead. 
When the local IAOS organizer wanted to encourage the foundation of another creamery in 
the Goresbridge area, he began by contacting Pierce F. Byrne, who lived at Garryduff House. 
Byrne was lukewarm and passed the organizer on to Captain John  E.  B. Loftus of Mount 
Loftus (“he is very good but his enthusiasm is intermittent”). Significantly, both Byrne and 
Loftus recognized the importance of supportive clergy. Byrne warned that his own local 
parish priest “is no good for that sort of thing, and it is hard to get the people together without 
a priest.”80 Loftus, for his part, reassured the IAOS that his local parish priests were “very 
favourably inclined.”81 The organizer, however, was apparently more concerned with the role 
of gentry, replying to Byrne: “With representative men like you & Mr Loftus as the head of 
affairs, the farmers of the district would soon fall in.”82 Loftus  was elected chairman of the 
Barrowvale creamery committee at its founding in 1913.83 The creamery’s “biggest supplier” 
took the position of honorary secretary.84 Loftus’s presence, like Wandesforde’s, was useful: 
early in 1914 he resolved a dispute with the Grand Canal Company over the discharge of 
creamery waste into the River Barrow by invoking both his ownership of the fishing rights at 
79 GCKA, 164/8, Castlecomer Minutes, 9 June 1916. 
80 NAI, 1088/98/1, Byrne to Courtney, 1 Jan 1913. See Simon Loftus, The Invention of 
Memory (London, 2013). 
81 NAI, 1088/98/1, Loftus to Anderson, 3 March 1913. 
82 NAI, 1088/98/1, Courtney to Byrne, nd. 
83 NAI, 1088/98/1, Courtney to Secretary, 21 May 1913. 
84 NAI, 1088/98/1, Courtney to Fant, 21 May 1913. 
                                                      
the particular location in question and “his position as a Conservator of Fisheries” of the 
river.85  
Such genteel leadership ebbed with the coming of war. In August 1914, flanked by his 
wife and son, Loftus performed the creamery’s opening ceremony less than an hour before 
departing to join his regiment on active service, nearly breaking down several times when 
discussing the war’s “interference with the development of local industry.”86 The dramatic 
scene marked the beginning of a transition as cooperative creameries lost their close 
association with constructive unionism and began to be linked instead with nationalist 
politics, especially in comparison with British-owned proprietary creameries.87 At the annual 
general meeting of April 1916 both Byrne and Loftus were replaced on the committee owing 
to their non-attendance at meetings, apparently replaced by men more rooted in the local 
farming community.88 During the War of Independence, creameries were targets of reprisal 
attacks by Crown Forces who saw them, perhaps, as local gathering-places for a population 
into which Irish Republican Army members seemed to blend seamlessly.89 According to one 
report, some forty-two creameries had been damaged by November 1920, a testament to their 
85 NAI, 1088/98/2, W. Delaney to Secretary, 23 Jan. 1914. 
86 NAI, 1088/98/3, Courtney to Secretary, 6 Aug. 1914. 
87 See McLaughlin, “Competing forms of cooperation,” p. 112; Jenkins, “Capitalists and Co-
operators,” p. 103. 
88 NAI, 1088/98/4, Courtney, 4 April 1916. 
89 Bielenberg and Ryan, An Economic History of Ireland, p. 72; Daly, The First Department, 
pp. 77-8. See M. Cronin, “Remembering the Creameries,” in M. McCarthy, ed., Ireland’s 
Heritages: Critical Perspectives on Memory and Identity (Aldershot, 2005), pp. 175-6. 
                                                      
significance as community gathering places in the eyes of British forces.90 Between 1911 and 
1926, the Protestant population of southern Ireland fell by nearly a third.91 Some of the 
Anglo-Irish landlords who had been involved in the cooperative movement left Ireland, 
including Plunkett himself, who moved to England and he devoted himself to the cause of co-
operative agriculture around the world.92 
Clergymen were thus far more likely than gentry to play significant, enduring roles in 
the leadership of creamery committees.93 The career of Father Thomas Phelan, while 
exceptional, is illuminating. Phelan was, according an IAOS organizer who visited Glenmore 
in spring 1905, “not very strong on creameries not having any personal experience of their 
working but he is a right good man.”94 He was soon a passionate convert to the cause of 
cooperation, getting the Glenmore Cooperative Creamery launched that autumn.95 He 
90 NAI, MS 33,718/F(184/1), Report to November, 1920 of Co-operative Creameries and 
Other Societies States to have been Destroyed or Damaged by Armed Forces of the Crown. 
91 E. Delaney, Demography, State and Society: Irish Migration to Britain, 1921-1971 
(Liverpool, 2000), p. 71. 
92 British Library, London, MSS EUR E267/69/2, Sir Horace Plunkett to Lady Seton, 21 June 
1923; GCKA, 228 Barrowvale Minutes, 27 May 1932. 
93 L. Kennedy, “The Early Response of the Irish Catholic Clergy to the Co-operative 
Movement,” in A. O’Day, ed., Reactions to Irish Nationalism (London, 1987), pp. 167-86; 
GCKA, 352 Muckalee Minutes, 3 March 1892, 8 June 1893, 5 June 1894, 6 June 1895, 1 
March 1900 and 355 Muckalee Minutes 29 May 1923, 11 Aug. 1931; NCA,  FAC/4/1/7, 
IAOS Annual Report (Dublin, 1934), p. 11, and FAC/4/1/8, IAOS Annual Report (Dublin, 
1935), p. 5. 
94 NAI, 1088/457/1, Report, 22 March 1905. 
95 NAI, 1088/457/1, Phelan to Anderson, 9 Sept. 1905. 
                                                      
reassured one woman that she would still be able to rear her calves on the skim milk from the 
creamery; another farmer, who owned twelve cows, was persuaded to join in once Phelan 
explained the principle of limited liability.96 He became a regional advocate for co-operation 
and for the IAOS.97 In 1914, for example, he lectured on co-operation while laying the 
foundation stone for the Barrowvale creamery,98 and from 1910 he served for the Waterford 
district on the IAOS committee.99 Phelan ruled the Glenmore creamery committee firmly: 
when a dispute arose about banking arrangements in 1906, for example, he followed the 
IAOS’s advice that this was “eminently a case for you to put your foot down decisively.”100 
By 1909, Glenmore had become a model creamery in the IAOS’s eyes.101  
When, in 1916, the church moved Father Phelan from Glenmore to Piltown, it became 
clear that his influence on creamery fortunes was decisive.102 From being a model creamery, 
Glenmore became a place marked by disputes and friction. Piltown’s creamery, meanwhile, 
saw its fortunes turn around under Phelan’s new leadership. It enjoyed booming growth and 
profits in the 1920s, only to sink once more into debt and recrimination when Phelan’s ill 
health removed him from active engagement with the creamery in the early 1930s.103 Phelan 
served a crucial role as mediator between creamery committees, milk suppliers, and, most 
96NAI, 1088/457/1, Phelan to Moore, 6 Dec. 1905. 
97 NAI, 1088/457/2, Secretary to Phelan, 22 Dec. 1911, and Phelan to Anderson, 26 Nov. 
1912. 
98 NAI, 1088/98/2, Secretary to Moore, 26 Feb 1914. 
99 Report of the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society (Dublin, 1935), 5. 
100 NAI, 1088/457/1, Anderson to Phelan, 25 May 1906. 
101 NAI, 1088/457/1, Secretary to Phelan, 13 Sept. 1909. 
102 GCKA, 315 Glenmore Minutes, 3 Oct. 1915. 
103 See NAI, 1088/780/5, Phelan to Riddall, 13 Dec. 1930. 
                                                      
importantly, creamery managers, particularly in areas requiring specialist knowledge such as 
accounting. In the absence of his leadership in this capacity, the creameries suffered. At 
Glenmore, he sought explicit training for committee men in the method of checking the 
books at their monthly meetings,104 despite the IAOS’s concern that “the more experienced 
managers would resent a very exhaustive check of this nature.”105 At Piltown, Phelan found a 
cooperative creamery that was not, initially, particularly interested in following his 
suggestion that it avail itself of IAOS accountancy inspections.106 With the support of some 
of the committee, however, Phelan carried his point and soon became an active chairman 
once more.107 He was successful in settling a labour dispute with the creamery employees in 
1919.108 The creamery was soon thriving.109  
In Phelan’s absence, however, relations between the manager and the committee 
frayed in both places. In Glenmore, trouble boiled over in 1931 when the committee sought 
to reduce the wages of the creamery staff.110 At a large, boisterous annual general meeting, a 
further argument developed over the right of many of those present to vote, since their shares 
in the cooperative had never been formally transferred to them from their deceased relatives. 
104 NAI, 1088/457/2, Secretary to Swain, 17 May 1910. 
105 NAI, 1088/457/2, Minute by Adams, 18 May 191. See NCA, FAC/6/1/5, IAOS Ulster 
Provisional Committee Report (Belfast, 1921), p. 14. 
106 NAI, 1088/780/2, Anderson to Phelan, 28 Dec. 1916; 1088/780/3, Phelan to Anderson, 13 
Nov. 1917. 
107 NAI, 1088/780/3, Phelan to Anderson, 31 Dec. 1917. 
108 See NAI, 1088/780/3, Phelan to Anderson, 5 April 1919. 
109 NAI, 1088/780/3, Anderson to Phelan, 30 June 1920, and 1088/780/4, Anderson, 1 Sept. 
1921. 
110 GCKA, 315 Glenmore Minutes, 1931. 
                                                      
The IAOS organizer at the meeting forcefully insisted that the cooperative’s democracy was 
not unlimited, comparing the rules governing cooperatives with the rules that enabled Gaelic 
Athletic Association football.111 This intervention convinced the farmers to assent to the legal 
transfer of their shares, but it did not solve the underlying dispute with the manager, who 
threatened strike action if the staff were not guaranteed work over the winter of 1931-32.112 
In August 1931, the committee formally dismissed the manager and his assistant,113 
provoking a bitter dispute between Glenmore creamery and the Irish Creamery Managers’ 
Association.114 In Piltown, too, the manager was dismissed at a large, argumentative annual 
general meeting in May 1932 amidst rumours of pilfering or at least being too willing to offer 
credit.115  
The problems posed by dishonest managers were well known, and they point to the 
broader problem of a cooperative structure that gave committees the responsibility for 
overseeing managers as their agents but forced them to rely on uncertain local leadership to 
exercise that power effectively.116 Pay was obviously an issue, since low pay could tempt 
managers to dishonesty.117 C. B. Riddall, then the assistant secretary of the IAOS, admitted in 
1939 that the practice of taking “secret commissions” had been “rampant in the Irish 
creamery industry years ago and has not yet been entirely eradicated, though the higher rates 
111 NAI, 1088/457/9, Courtney, 21 April 1931.  
112 NAI, 1088/457/9, Mockler to Kennedy, 14 Aug. 1931. 
113 NAI, 1088/457/9, Langford, 20 Aug. 1931. 
114 NAI, 1088/457/9, Riddall, 16 and 31 March 1932. 
115 NAI, 1088/780/5, Kennedy, 31 May 1932 and see Courtney, 22 Feb. 1932. 
116 On rumours of dishonest managers, see NAI, 1088/98/1, Courtney to Secretary, 2 May 
1913, and Secretary to Courtney, 3 May 1913. 
117 NCA, FAC/6/1/1, IAOS Ulster Provisional Committee Report (Belfast, 1915), p. 9. 
                                                      
of salary now commanded by creamery managers in comparison with those paid to them 
years ago account for the improvement.”118 But there were deeper tensions too. Managers 
were interested in their careers rather than a particular creamery or the broader cooperative 
project. As the IAOS put it in 1925, “the scope for their co-operation is limited by the system 
which places a premium upon competitive salesmanship and rewards opportunism at the 
expense of co-operation.”119 Creamery minute books and correspondence are rife with battles 
over managers. At Muckalee in 1903, the manager “was ordered to lodge all cash received 
for goods” with the parish priest, and he was given strict instructions about not offering credit 
without authority from the committee.120 Evidently this was not sufficient: just over a month 
later, he agreed to tender his resignation.121 A good manager, on the other hand, could make 
all the difference: in 1912, the Muckalee committee increased the manager’s salary to 
recognize how his “careful management” had led to increased turnover, the elimination of 
debts, and the improvement of machinery and buildings.122 
 To some extent, the IAOS tried to provide quality control with respect to creamery 
managers, but they were hindered by a conflict of interest, namely their evident desire to find 
positions for managers who had fallen on evil days. In 1913 the IAOS recommended a “very 
unfortunate” man for the job of assistant manager at Glenmore, noting that he was “a 
conscientious, honest hard-working man and a teetotaller.”123 The committee reluctantly 
complied, but some of them then used their influence in the town to prevent any lodging 
118 NCA, FAC/1/2/5, C. B. Riddall to M. Digby, 26 July 1939. 
119 NCA, FAC/4/1/3Report of the IAOS (Dublin, 1925), Draft. 
120 GCKA, 355 Muckalee Minutes, 4 Aug. 1903. 
121 GCKA, 355 Muckalee Minutes, Minutes, 11 Sept. 1903. 
122 GCKA, 356 Muckalee Minutes, Minutes, 27 Feb. 1912. 
123 NAI, 1088/457/2, Secretary to Phelan, 19 March 1913. 
                                                      
being available for the man when he arrived, forcing the cancellation of the appointment.124 
A bad recommendation could have serious consequences. In May 1914, the IAOS suggested 
a manager for Barrowvale who had “rather suffered at the hands” of his former employers 
and who deserved “a new start in a new Creamery.”125 This manager was a local Kilkenny 
man.126 He was hired, but he struggled to produce high-quality butter and, by 1918, was 
casting about for better-paid positions.127 Unwisely, the committee allowed him to conduct 
some private trading on the side, intensifying the principal agent problem by giving him yet 
another interest separate from the committee’s own. Then, in 1920, the disastrous truth 
emerged: this manager had been systematically stealing from the creamery and losing the 
money on horses – ultimately embezzling, according to the IAOS auditor,  over £2,000 “by 
deliberately and consistently falsifying the accounts.”128 The  IAOS recognized internally that 
it had some responsibility for the debacle. It had “got him the job at Barrowvale & warned 
him to go straight,” then compounded the problem by failing to pick up on the theft during 
routine inspections.129 This is the sort of thing that someone like Phelan tried to prevent by 
training committee members to supervise the books, engaging IAOS auditors, and enquiring 
regularly about best practices in organizing and running a creamery. 
124 NAI, 1088/457/2, Phelan to Anderson, 2 April 1913. 
125 NAI, 1088/98/2, Secretary to Loftus, 2 May 1914, and see Comerford to Fant, 8 April 
1914 and 27 May 1914.  
126 NAI, 1088/98/9, Courtney to Fennelly, 12 June 1930. 
127 NAI, 1088/98/5, Comerford to Fant, 9 Feb. 1918, and Comerford to Murphy, 4 July 1918. 
128 NAI, 1088/98/6, P. J. Dunne to Anderson, 11 June 1920, and 1088/98/9, Moore to 
Anderson, 12 May 1920, and see Courtney to Fennelly, 12 June 1930 
129 NAI, 1088/98/6, Courtney minute, 14 May 1920, on Secretary to Courtney, 13 May 1920; 
see Fant to Secretary, 16 May 1920, and 1088/98/9 , Courtney to Fennelly, 12 June 1930.  
                                                      
Cooperative creameries were imagined as exercises in practical democracy, but they 
were also meant to serve very specific economic and political goals. The Irish cooperative 
creamery system, despite rhetoric to the contrary, was built in a way that reinforced and, to 
some extent, reimagined social hierarchies, but in no way inverted them. Without 
authoritative leadership in the form of local landlords, priests, or the state, the system 
foundered on its own structural limitations. Irish cooperation was initially the brainchild of 
philanthropists who sought to stabilize rural society and provide an on-going role for the 
Anglo-Irish gentry. It then became a vehicle for the Irish Free State to stage economic 
intervention at one remove with the aim of stabilizing a major export industry. McLaughlin 
has noted some parallels with Bohemia and Eastern Europe, where landlords and politicians 
were also involved in setting up cooperatives, but he emphasizes that Ireland’s top-down 
experience of creating cooperatives was fairly distinctive in the European context.130 The 
rarity of state intervention should not be overstated: even in Denmark, the state provided 
indirect support to the dairy industry in the 19th century.131 Significantly, the state also played 
an important role in the creation of cooperatives across the British Empire in the twentieth 
century, with active, interventionist Co-operative Departments and Registrars seeking to 
organize peasant farmers into cooperatives in districts ranging from India to East and West 
Africa and beyond.132 Cooperatives were powerful precisely because they were both 
130 McLaughlin, “Competing forms of cooperation,” pp. 98-9. 
131 I. Henriksen, M. Lampe, and P. Sharp, “The strange birth of liberal Denmark: Danish 
trade protection and the growth of the dairy industry since the mid-nineteenth century,” 
Economic History Review 65: 2 (2012): 770-88, pp. 786-7. 
132 See C. F. Strickland, Co-operation for Africa, with an introduction by the Rt. Hon. the 
Lord Lugard (London, 1933), pp. xii-xiii; Imperial Conference on Agricultural Co-operation 
(London, 1938), pp. 192-3; M. Nicholson, Co-operation in the Colonies (Manchester, 1953); 
                                                      
democratic and highly structured, linking older social hierarchies to new patterns of 
governance and trade. In the consistent problems faced by farmers trying to supervise 
creamery managers without recourse to those older hierarchies, the conservative logic of the 
cooperative is illuminated. The Irish Free State’s accession to the interwar world of state 
direction and economic planning was conditioned by the patterns it inherited from the British 
administration, particularly a reliance on paternalist semi-state organizations that promised, 
but always deferred, democratic empowerment.  
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